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The approval of the European Directive (EU) 2019/790 on copyright and related 
rights in the Digital Single Market has caused a considerable storm. Unlike the 
original draft, the final text provides for no general monitoring obligation. 
However, the ISPs will likely be required to implement filtering measures to avoid 
liability for unauthorized acts of communication to the public of copyright-
protected works. The lack of harmonization of the Directive with existing laws in 
non-EU countries will negatively impact the ISPs. To limit these consequences, this 
Article proposes the signature of an International Treaty in the framework of WIPO 
including issues such as the role of the ISPs, the liability of the ISPs and safe 
harbors. As regards filtering measures, the proposed Treaty gives freedom to States 
to implement them. Any filtering should be specific, limited, must not impose 
substantial costs on ISP or substantial burdens and be subject to human review.  
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Writing: Edward Lee and Runhua Wang, as well as, professors: Alain Villeneuve, for his 
encouragement; and Graeme Dinwoodie, for precipitating my great interest in international 
copyright issues. 
EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market and ISP Liability: What's 






II.	 New Obligations for the Internet Service Providers (ISP) Provided Under 
 the EU Directive on Copyright .............................................................87	
A.	 EU Directive on Copyright ...............................................................87	
1.	 Current EU Approach to ISP Safe Harbors ....................................88	
2.	 What the Directive Changes ..........................................................89	
B.	 The EU Directive Conflicts with ISP Safe Harbors in Other Countries
 ……………………………………………………………………….93	




C.	 Need for an International Approach to the Issue ...............................98	
1.	 Lack of Harmonization Poses Difficulties to ISPs .........................98	
2.	 Impact of the EU Directive on Copyright on International    ISPs ..99	
III.	 Proposing a Solution: Signature of a Multilateral International Treaty in 
 the Framework of WIPO................................................................. 100	
A.	 General Guidelines and Text of the Proposed Treaty ...................... 100	
1.	 Text of the Proposed WIPO Treaty ............................................. 100	
2.	 Explanation of the Treaty Key Provisions ................................... 104	
B.	 Reasons for Adopting the Proposal ................................................. 106	
1.	 Harmonization ............................................................................ 106	
2.	 Economic Utility ......................................................................... 107	
3.	 Improvement of the Copyright System Enforcement ................... 107	
IV.	 Responding to Potential Criticisms of the Proposal ......................... 108	
A.	 The Proposed International Treaty is not Political Feasible ............. 108	
B.	 The Suggested Treaty Does Not Balance the Interests of the Actors   
 Involved in the World of Internet .................................................... 109	
V.	 Conclusion ......................................................................................... 110	
EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market and ISP Liability: What's 





“Europe just approved new copyright rules that could change the 
internet.”1 This was one of the many article titles published by news outlets 
throughout Europe and the United States in September 2018. These articles 
announced amendments introduced within the Proposal of Directive on Copyright 
in the Digital Single Market approved by the European Parliament.2 The article 
titles led some to imagine the end of the internet as previously known, with 
particular negative implications to the U.S. tech giants like Google, Facebook, and 
Youtube. 
The proposed Directive faced strong criticism as soon as it was published.3 
One of the most controversial provisions included was the obligation of the Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) to filter the content uploaded by the platform’s users  to 
avoid copyright infringements.4 However, this provision was later removed in the 
final version of the Directive.5 Even so, the Directive still assigns an active role in 
preventing copyright infringement to ISPs—limiting the applicability of safe 
harbors in case ISPs fail to obtain authorizations from the copyright owners.6 
It seems clear that with the Directive, the EU has a specific European regime 
as far as ISPs liability and safe harbors are concerned. This new regime seems to 
be in contrast with the existing legislation and practice in jurisdictions outside the 
EU. This lack of harmonization will most likely cause damages to the ISPs 
operating on a worldwide scale.7 Indeed, ISPs will have to implement a variety of 
technical methods and legal strategies to approach these differences. Thus, they will 
                                               
1 Ivana Kottasová, Europe Just Approved New Copyright Rules that Could Change the Internet, 
CNN, (Sep. 12, 2018) https://perma.cc/LDZ7-LGVC; see also Hamza Shaban, The E.U. Just Voted 
to Advance Digital Copyright Rules That Would Force Google, Facebook and Others to Pay Up, 
Tʜᴇ Wᴀꜱʜɪɴɢᴛᴏɴ Pᴏꜱᴛ, (Sept. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/Q3S6-P6NH; see also Mark Sweney, EU 
Copyright Law May Force Tech Giants to Pay Billions to Publishers, Tʜᴇ Gᴜᴀʀᴅɪᴀɴ, (Sept. 12, 
2018), https://perma.cc/T7EF-4GA7. 
2 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the 
Digital Single Market, COM (2016) 593 final (Sept. 14, 2016).  
3 Kottasová, supra note 1. 
4 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the 
Digital Single Market, supra, note 2 at art. 13. 
5 Directive 2019/790, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on Copyright 
and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and Amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, 
2019 O.J. (L 130). 
6 Id. at art. 17. 
7 Especially the tech giants: Facebook, Google, Twitter, and YouTube. 
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probably be inclined to reduce the number of their investments, abandon ventures, 
or not commence operations in markets where burdensome obligations are 
imposed. Consequently, the local and global economy would be harmed.  
This Paper proposes that States adopt a Multilateral International Treaty 
within the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The Treaty should 
provide minimum, standard, and reasonable obligations for ISPs concerning the 
protection of copyright. It should also implement a uniform ISPs liability regime 
with the same minimum safe harbors for all ISPs, regardless of where they are 
located.  
Part I of this paper provides an overview of the current EU safe harbors 
applicable to ISPs. It then focuses on ISPs’ obligation to get authorizations from 
the copyright owners and the liability of ISPs in the absence of such authorizations. 
Moreover, the Paper analyzes ISPs’ liability, safe harbors, and filtering obligations 
in non-EU countries. Finally, Part I suggests that an international harmonized 
approach is therefore needed to overcome differences in the domestic legislation of 
EU and non-EU countries. Part II proposes a solution to the problem through the 
negotiation and adoption of an International Multilateral Treaty. Part III addresses 
the potential criticisms of the proposal.  
II. NEW OBLIGATIONS FOR THE INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS (ISP) 
PROVIDED UNDER THE EU DIRECTIVE ON COPYRIGHT 
The Directive aims at modernizing EU copyright rules, achieving a fully 
functioning Digital Single Market, and closing the so-called “value gap” between 
internet platforms and copyright holders.8 The definitive text of the Directive 
introduces specific obligations for the ISPs as well as a particular liability regime 
for ISPs in case they do not get the required authorizations from the copyright 
holders. Part I explains the problems created by the new European provisions from 
an international perspective.  
A. EU Directive on Copyright 
The Directive assigns an active role to ISPs as far as prevention and 
enforcement of copyright infringement are concerned. This perspective seems to be 
a growing trend at the international level. Since the middle of 2007 entertainment 
industries, government legislators, and regulatory agencies increasingly have been 
pressuring ISPs to play a more active role in preventing copyright infringement ex-
                                               
8 See Giancarlo F. Frosio, Reforming Intermediary Liability in the Platform Economy: A European 
Digital Single Market Strategy, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 19, 26 (2017). 
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ante. “Well-organized copyright industry associations have effectively lobbied 
governments worldwide, convincing public authorities that greater enforcement 
efforts are needed to combat online copyright infringement.”9  
Despite this growing trend, many countries of the world do not grant such 
an active role to ISPs or provide safe harbors that differ from the EU safe harbors. 
As highlighted above, the differences among the domestic legislation on ISPs’ 
enforcement police powers, liability, and applicability of safe harbors, create a 
problem for the ISPs operating at the international level. Therefore, this Paper 
encourages an international harmonized approach to these issues.  
1. Current EU Approach to ISP Safe Harbors  
In the EU, safe harbors for ISPs are regulated under the E-commerce 
Directive10 and more specifically in the transposing laws in each Member State.11 
Safe harbors prevent ISPs from being liable provided they meet the requirements 
applicable to each particular safe harbor.12  In the E-commerce Directive, safe 
harbors regard ISPs exemption from liability for “mere conduit”13, “catching”,14 
and “hosting.”15 
The Copyright Directive reaffirms the non-applicability of the safe harbor 
for hosting activities provided under article 14 of E-commerce Directive when “the 
recipient of the service is acting under the authority or the control of the Article 13 
provider.”16 Indeed, section 17.3 of the Copyright Directive provides that the safe 
                                               
9 Jeremy de Beer & Christopher D. Clemmer, Global Trends in Online Copyright Enforcement: A 
Non-Neutral Role for Network Intermediaries?, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 375, 404 (2009), 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/29763019.pdf?ab_segments=0%252Fbasic_SYC-
5152%252Ftest&refreqid=excelsior%3A38085fe1f8524393dfeb77e4e73cca45 (referencing 
Wɪʟʟɪᴀᴍ Pᴀᴛʀʏ, Mᴏʀᴀʟ Pᴀɴɪᴄꜱ ᴀɴᴅ ᴛʜᴇ Cᴏᴘʏʀɪɢʜᴛ Wᴀʀꜱ (2009). 
10 See Council Directive 2000/31, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the 
Internal Market, 2000 O.J (L 178), 1–16 (EC) (2008), [hereinafter Directive on Electronic 
Commerce or E-commerce Directive]. 
11 Domestic laws of each Member State will not be studied in this Paper. 
12 Council Directive 2000/31, supra, note 10 at art. 2 (defining “service provider” as “any natural 
or legal person providing an information society service,” as defined under art. 2 (a)). 
13 Id. at art. 12. Exemption applies provided that the ISP “(a) does not initiate the transmission; (b) 
does not select the receiver of the transmission; and (c) does not select or modify the information 
contained in the transmission.” 
14 Id. at art. 13. 
15 Id. at art. 14(a)(b).  
16 Id. at recital 42, recital 44, recital 46 and art. 14(2).  
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harbor for hosting will not apply to the situations covered by the article when an 
ISP performs an act of communication to the public or an act of making available 
to the public. On the other hand, as it will be discussed below, it can be argued that 
Article 17.4 provides for a new specific safe harbor with different requirements 
based on the size of the ISP involved. 
2. What the Directive Changes  
The proposed Directive obligates Member States to ensure that online 
content sharing service providers17 perform either an act of public communication 
or an act of making available to the public access to copyright-protected works or 
other protected subject-matter uploaded by its users. Thus, the Directive obliges 
ISPs to get authorization from the right holders. If no authorization is granted, they 
will be liable for unauthorized acts of communication to the public, unless they 
demonstrate having fulfilled the conditions under section 17.4. No general filtering 
obligations are provided in the approved version of the Directive. These provisions 
will be further discussed below.  
a. Proposed Obligation to Obtain an Authorization 
 from the Right Holders  
As highlighted above, under section 17.1 of the Directive, the ISPs’ main 
obligation is to get authorization from the right holders referred to in Article 3(1) 
and (2) of Directive 2001/29/EC [hereinafter InfoSoc Directive]18 in order to 
communicate or make available to the public works or other subject matter. They 
can do that, for instance, by concluding a licensing agreement. Thus, it is expected 
that ISPs: 
[W]ill negotiate a license rate with major rights holders 
…to compensate owners for potentially infringing uploads. But for 
the many other uploads where the rights holder is unknown, 
                                               
17 “Online content sharing service provider” is defined under article 2 (6) of the Copyright Directive 
as “[A] provider of an information society service of which the main or one of the main purposes is 
to store and give the public access to a large amount of copyright-protected works or other protected 
subject matter uploaded by its users, which it organizes and promotes for profit-making purposes. 
Providers of services, such as not-for-profit online encyclopedias, not-for-profit educational and 
scientific repositories, open source software-developing and-sharing platforms, electronic 
communication service providers as defined in Directive (EU) 2018/1972, online marketplaces, 
business-to-business cloud services and cloud services that allow users to upload content for their 
own use, are not “online content sharing service providers” within the meaning of this Directive.” 
18 Directive 2001/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 On the 
Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, art. 
2., 2001 O.J. (L 167) 1, 16 (EC).  
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service providers will be required to carry out a “best efforts” 
diligent search for a rights holder to request a license or be liable 
for infringement.19  
The difficulties for the implementation of these licenses are clear. This is 
especially evident in the determination of the price of the license and how to prove 
that best efforts were used to identify and get the license from the right holder. 
Section 17.1 poses another problem concerning the identification of the 
users whose acts must be included or not in the authorization by providing an 
undefined criterion. Section 17.1 requires that the authorization covers acts carried 
out by users of the services falling within Article 3 of Directive 2001/29/EC when 
they are not acting on a commercial basis or their activity does not generate 
significant revenues. The Directive does not define “commercial basis” or 
“significant revenues”. These gaps should, therefore, be filed by each Member 
State. It may be expected that they will provide different definitions of these 
concepts, leading to different applicable rules in the EU Member States.    
b. Liability of the ISP in Case of Violation to the 
 Obligations Provided Under the Proposed EU 
 Directive on Copyright 
The Directive imposes higher standards of liability on ISPs. This conclusion 
can be reached, first, because they will perform an act of communication to the 
public or an act of making available to the public when they give public access to 
copyright-protected works uploaded by its users (section 17.1). Second, if ISPs do 
not get an authorization from the right holders, that they will liable for unauthorized 
acts of communication to the public of copyright-protected works and third, 
because, under section 17.3 of the Directive, the safe harbor for hosting provided 
under Article 14.1 of the E-commerce Directive will not apply to the situations 
covered by the Article.  
Regarding the liability of ISPs provided under the Directive, some 
scholars20 have concluded that the “construction of EU law included in the Proposal 
would make hosting providers directly liable, rather than secondarily liable” 
because ISPs will perform an act of communication to the public. At this regard, 
                                               
19 Kris Erickson, The European Copyright Directive: License First, Ask Questions Later, MEDIA 
POLICY PROJECT BLOG (Apr. 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/9SW8-53RS. 
20 See Giancarlo Frosio, To Filter, or Not to Filter? That Is the Question in EU Copyright Reform, 
36 Cᴀʀᴅᴏᴢᴏ Aʀᴛꜱ & Eɴᴛ. L.J. 331, 343 (2018).  
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other scholars have stressed: “the alignment between CJEU case law21 and policy 
action on the side of the European Commission, especially with regard to the basic 
idea that the making available, by a hosting provider, of third-party uploaded 
copyright content, may fall within the scope of Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc 
Directive22 [acts of communication to the public]”. In sum, if ISPs do not get the 
authorizations from the right holders, they will be held primarily liable.  
On the other hand, the Directive (probably in an effort to balance the higher 
liability imposed on the ISPs) introduces a new specific safe harbor. Indeed, under 
section 17.4, in case the ISPs do not get an authorization from the right holders, in 
order to avoid liability they will have to demonstrate that they have: (a) made best 
efforts to obtain an authorization, and (b) made, in accordance with high industry 
standards of professional diligence, best efforts to ensure the unavailability of 
specific works and other subject matter for which the right holders have provided 
the service providers with the relevant and necessary information,23 and in any 
event (c) acted expeditiously, upon receiving a sufficiently substantiated notice by 
the right holders, to remove from their websites or to disable access to the notified 
works and subject matters, and made best efforts to prevent their future uploads 
under paragraph (b). Additionally, according to section 17.5, the following factors 
will be considered to determine whether the ISP has complied with these 
obligations: (a) the type, the audience and the size of services and the type of works 
or other subject-matter uploaded by the users; (b) the availability of suitable and 
effective means and their cost for service providers.  
Furthermore, the ISPs will have to comply with different conditions in 
accordance with their importance and volume of visits. Indeed, under section 17.5 
some organizations must respect the requirements under section a) and c) of section 
17.4 to be exempted from liability.24 On the other hand, where the average number 
                                               
21 See Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein v. Ziggo BV and XS4ALL Internet BV. 2017 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:45. In this case, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held an ISP 
directly liable for performing an act of communication to the public, describing the requirements 
for an act to be considered “communication to the public.” 
22 Eʟᴇᴏɴᴏʀᴀ Rᴏsᴀᴛɪ, Tʜᴇ CJEU Pɪʀᴀᴛᴇ Bᴀʏ Jᴜᴅɢᴍᴇɴᴛ ᴀɴᴅ Iᴛs Iᴍᴘᴀᴄᴛ ᴏɴ ᴛʜᴇ Lɪᴀʙɪʟɪᴛʏ ᴏғ Oɴʟɪɴᴇ 
Pʟᴀᴛғᴏʀᴍs (July 21, 2017), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3006591. 
23 It is unclear how the EU will effectively implement this method of providing information to ISPs. 
24 Directive 2019/790, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on Copyright 
and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and Amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, 
art. 17, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92. The first paragraph of Article 17, Subsection 6 reads "“Member States 
shall provide that when new online content sharing service providers whose services have been 
available to the public in the Union for less than three years and which have an annual turnover 
below EUR 10 million within the meaning of the Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC, the 
conditions applicable to them under the liability regime set out in paragraph 4 are limited to the 
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of monthly unique visitors of these service providers exceeds 5 million, calculated 
based on the last calendar year, ISPs will also demonstrate that they have made best 
efforts to prevent further uploads of the notified works for which the right holders 
have provided the relevant and necessary information.25  
c. Filtering Obligations  
Unlike the previous versions, the final text of the Directive (section 17.8) 
clearly states that the application of Article 17 shall not lead to any general 
monitoring obligation.26 Despite this, it may be argued that the ISPs will still be 
forced to implement filtering measures mainly “to ensure the unavailability of 
specific works … for which the right holders have provided the service providers 
with the relevant and necessary information” and “to prevent their future uploads 
in accordance with paragraph (b)” (section 17.4 letters b) and c)) to be able to 
qualify for the exemption of liability in case they did not get authorizations from 
the right holders.  
Even if the Directive does not provide for mandatory filtering obligations, 
it is expected that filters will be implemented anyway to comply with the 
requirements of section 17.4. ISPs will probably introduce algorithmic filters 
because it will be too difficult to have a human review of huge amounts of content. 
This measure will probably cause the preventive removal of the content (regardless 
if it’s copyrighted or not) to avoid liability.27 Finally, it is worth pointing out that 
the Directive assigns ISPs the role of deciding the applicability of fair uses 
exceptions, and therefore, in the absence of non-automatic filters, the content will 
be removed if it is not evident that fair uses exceptions apply. Indeed, users might 
be affected because the automatic filters that ISPs will surely apply simply 
“cannot account for fair use and the other limitations on copyright intended to 
protect freedom of speech”.28 
                                               
compliance with the point (a) of paragraph 4 and to acting expeditiously, upon receiving a 
sufficiently substantiated notice, to remove the notified works and subject matters from its website 
or to disable access to them.” 
25 Id.  
26 The implementation of a general monitoring obligation (as it was envisaged in the previous 
versions of the Directive) would have been against art. 15 of the E-commerce Directive and against 
the CJEU case law. See, e.g. Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Soc. Belge des auteurs 
(SABAM), ECLI:EU:C:2011:771, para. 29. 
27 Kris Erickson, The European Copyright Directive: License First, Ask Questions Later, LSE 
Mᴇᴅɪᴀ (Apr. 2, 2019).  
28 Mitch Stoltz, Copyright’s Safe Harbors Preserve What We Love About the Internet, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.eff.org/it/deeplinks/2019/01/copyrights-safe-
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B. The EU Directive Conflicts with ISP Safe Harbors in Other  
  Countries 
ISP liability, safe harbors, and the role of ISPs in preventing copyright 
infringement will be analyzed below in four non-EU countries to show the legal 
gap that would be created between these countries and the EU countries. ISPs in 
non-European countries have been held secondarily liable unless they have actual 
knowledge of the infringing activities of the users or authorize the infringement. 
Safe harbors were introduced to limit their liability provided they meet some 
specific requirements. No general obligation of filtering is imposed on ISPs in the 
countries analyzed. Finally, the analysis below is also relevant to outline the 
solution proposed under section II 
1. United States  
In the United States, ISPs have traditionally been held secondarily liable. 
Cases such as Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Frena29, Sega Enterprises v. 
MAHPHIA30, and Religious Tech. Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication 
Services, Inc.31 prompted the telecom and Internet industry groups to lobby for the 
enactment of the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act 
(OCILLA), part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).32 Section 512 
of OCILLA  provides four safe harbors  for qualified service providers based on (a) 
“Transitory Digital Network Communications,” (b) “System Caching,” (c) 
“Information Residing on Systems or Networks At Direction of Users,” and (d) 
“Information Location Tools.” 33 
To qualify for any provision of limited liability under the safe harbors, the 
defendant must be a “service provider,” and fulfill the required conditions of 
eligibility, including the adoption and reasonable implementation of a “repeat 
infringer” policy that “provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of 
subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network.”34  
                                               
harbors-preserve-what-we-love-about-internet 
29 Playboy Enterprises v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
30 Sega Enterprises v. Mahphia, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
31 Religious Tech. Center v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Serv., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 
32 DANIEL SENG, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL APPROACHES TO THE LIABILITY OF 
INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES para. 155, at 55  (Nov. 10, 2010), 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/doc/liability_of_internet_intermediaries.pdf. 
33 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a)-(d) (2018); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 
2012). 
3417 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (2018).  
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Additionally, the service provider must accommodate “standard technical 
measures” that are “used by copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted 
works.”35 Service providers must also satisfy the requirements of a particular safe 
harbor. To qualify for the safe harbor under § 512(c), which covers infringement 
claims that arise “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that 
resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service 
provider,”– the service provider must have neither actual knowledge that the 
material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing nor 
awareness of facts and circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.36 
The knowledge or awareness must regard “specific infringing activity.”37 In any 
case, the provider that gains knowledge or awareness of infringing activity retains 
safe harbor protection if it “acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the 
material.”38 
Under American Law, ISPs are required to remove infringing posts through 
an established “Notice and Take-Down” regime.39 In other words, they have only 
the obligation to respond to a “notice” that gives a specific file location, but no 
obligation to “look for” other infringements of that kind.40 Finally, it must be 
pointed out that some ISPs, such as Youtube,41 have implemented filtering 
mechanisms allowing the detection and removal of infringing copyrighted content 
in cooperation with copyright owners.  
2. Australia 
In Australian case law,42 ISPs are held secondarily liable for copyright 
infringement under the doctrine of authorization.43 Section 112E was added to the 
                                               
35 Id. at §§ 512(i)(1)(B), (i)(2). 
36 Id. at §§ 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). 
37 See Viacom Int’l, Inc., 676 F.3d at 26. 
38 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2018).  
39 See Jennifer L. Hanley, ISP Liability and Safe Harbor Provisions: Implications of Evolving 
International Law for the Approach Set Out in Viacom v. Youtube, 11 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 183, 184 
(2012). 
40 Jan Bernd Nordemann, Internet Copyright Infringement: Remedies Against Intermediaries-the 
European Perspective on Host and Access Providers, 59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 773, 784 
(2012). 
41 Id. at 784–785. 
42 See generally Universal Music Austl. v. Cooper [2006] FCA 78 (Austl.); see also Roadshow 
Films Pty Ltd & Ors v iiNet Ltd [2012] HCA 16 (Austl.). 
43 See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 36(1) (Austl.) [hereinafter Australian Copyright Act]. See also id. 
s 101(1).  
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Australian Copyright Act44 to provide the ISP with some specific safe harbors. 
Moreover, section 116AA of the Australian Copyright Act provides four safe 
harbors that apply to the “carriage service providers” (CSPs)45 for copyright 
infringements that relate to carrying out certain online activities. Section 116AC46, 
Section 116AD47, Section 116AE48, and Section 116AF49 define the four categories 
of safe harbor activities. Under Section 116AH50, CSPs must satisfy the general 
conditions as well as the specific and detailed conditions for the particular safe 
harbor category. In case CSPs satisfy the conditions provided under Section 
116AH, the specific limitations under Section 116AG will apply to CSPs. 
Australia does not impose an active role to ISPs regarding the prevention 
and enforcement of copyright. As a general rule, Section 116AH(2) of the 
Australian Copyright specifically provides that the CSP is not required to monitor 
its service or to seek evidence of infringing activity. 
3. Canada  
Canada has traditionally imposed secondary liability to ISPs in the absence 
of authorization. Authorization of copyright infringement was characterized as 
direct infringement liability for the ISP.51 The amendments introduced in 2012 to 
the Copyright Act52 created a new kind of liability for enabling copyright 
infringement over the Internet53 and it also included some safe harbors54 and a 
                                               
44 See id. s 112E. The provision was added by the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 
2000 (Cth) based on the Agreed Statement to Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996.   
45 See id. s 116AA.  
46 Id. s 116AC. Category A activity is applicable to CSPs that provide facilities or services for 
transmitting, routing or providing connections for copyright material, or the intermediate and 
transient storage of copyright material in the course of transmission, routing or providing 
connections. 
47 Id. Category B activity is applicable to CSPs that cache copyright material through an automatic 
process. 
48 Id. Category C activity is applicable to CSPs that store, at the direction of a user, copyright 
material on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the CSP. 
49 Id. Category D activity is applicable to CSPs that refer users to an online location using 
information location tools or technology. 
50 Id. Section 116AH Item 1 provides that “the carriage service provider must adopt and reasonably 
implement a policy that provides for termination, in appropriate circumstances, of the accounts of 
repeat infringers.” 
51 SENG, supra note 32, at 14. 
52 See generally Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42 (Can). 
53 Id. 
54 These safe harbors “are not revolutionary considering that Canadian courts have addressed 
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notice and notice regime. Safe harbors are applicable to ISPs,55 Internet Catching 
Services providers56, Internet Storage Service Providers57, and Internet Search 
Engine Providers.58 Moreover, Copyright Act sections 41.25, 41.26, and 41.27(3) 
provide for a “notice and notice” regime.59 ISPs are not compulsorily required to 
remove the infringing content and they can benefit from the safe harbors 
independently of whether they comply with the “notice and notice” obligations.60 
Finally, Canadian Law does not impose general filtering obligations. It may 
be expected that the country will not introduce such measures also to comply with 
the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) signed in September 
2018. Indeed, this Treaty specifically states that “monitoring” or “affirmatively 
                                               
pretty extensively the liability of Internet intermediaries despite the absence of statutory provisions 
like the DMCA.” David Bensalem, Comparative Analysis Of Copyright Enforcement In The 
Cloud Under U.S And Canadian Law: The Liability Of Internet Intermediaries (2012), 
https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/33922/3/Bensalem_David_201211_LLM_thesis.
pdf  
55 Canadian Copyright Act, Section 31.1 (1) provides: “A person who, in providing services related 
to the operation of the Internet or another digital network, provides any means for the 
telecommunication or the reproduction of a work or other subject-matter through the Internet or that 
other network does not, solely by reason of providing those means, infringe copyright in that work 
or other subject-matter.” 
56 Canadian Copyright Act, Section 31.1 (3) provides: “Subject to subsection (4), a person referred 
to in subsection (1) who caches the work or other subject-matter, or does any similar act in relation 
to it, to make the telecommunication more efficient does not, by virtue of that act alone, infringe 
copyright in the work or other subject matter.” 
57 Canadian Copyright Act, Section 31.1 (5) provides: “Subject to subsection (6), a person who, for 
the purpose of allowing the telecommunication of a work or other subject-matter through the 
Internet or another digital network, provides digital memory in which another person stores the work 
or other subject-matter does not, by virtue of that act alone, infringe copyright in the work or other 
subject-matter.” 
58 Canadian Copyright Act, Section 41.27 (1) provides: “In any proceedings for infringement of 
copyright, the owner of the copyright in a work or other subject-matter is not entitled to any remedy 
other than an injunction against a provider of an information location tool that is found to have 
infringed copyright by making a reproduction of the work or other subject-matter or by 
communicating that reproduction to the public by telecommunication.” 
59 By this regime, aggrieved parties can send a notice of infringement to ISPs and the recipient must, 
as soon as feasible, forward the notice electronically to the person to whom the electronic location 
identified by the location data specified in the notice belongs and inform the claimant of its 
forwarding or, if applicable, of the reason why it was not possible to forward it.  
60 Online Infringement: Canadian “Notice and Notice” vs U.S. “Notice and Takedown”, 
ENTERTAINMENT & MEDIA LAW SIGNAL (June 27, 2012), 
http://www.entertainmentmedialawsignal.com/online-infringement-canadian-notice-and-notice-vs-
us-notice-and-takedown [https://perma.cc/65SD-Y8XU]. 
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seeking facts indicating infringing activity” is not required.61 
4. China  
Under Chinese law, ISPs are secondarily liable on fault-based principles 
such as negligence62 or principles of joint or accessory liability.63 For contributory 
infringement either for joint or accessory liability to apply, there must be evidence 
of the defendant intermediary’s actual knowledge of the infringement.64 
The Regulations enacted in 200665 provide safe harbors to ISPs. These rules 
establish which kind of network service providers are eligible for safe harbors and 
when they are not applicable. The Safe harbors adopted were inspired by § 512 
DMCA in the U.S. and the Article 14 E-commerce Directive and are those under 
section 20-23.66 It must finally be pointed out that China has enacted no rule 
preventing the imposition of a monitoring obligation against copyright 
infringement67 under the Provisions enacted in 2013.68  
The following chart summarizes the approaches of the countries studied 
above as far as ISP liabilities, safe harbors, notice of infringement, and filtering 
                                               
61 Ernesto Van der Sar, “NAFTA” Replacement Extends Canada’s Copyright Term to Life +70 
years, TORRENT FREAK (Oct. 1, 2018), https://torrentfreak.com/nafta-replacement-extends-
canadas-copyright-term-to-life-70-years-181001/ [https://perma.cc/4ENY-APKJ]. 
62 Zhongguo Yinyue Zhuzuoquanxiehui Su Wangyigongsi, Yidongtongxin Gongsi Qinfan Xinxi 
Wangluo Chuanbo Quan Jiufenan (中国音乐著作权协会诉网易公司、移动通信公司侵犯信息
网络传播权纠纷案) [Music Copyright Soc’y of China v. Netease Commc’ns., Inc. & Mobile 
Commc’ns Corp.], 2003 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 5 (Beijing No. 2 Interm. People’s Ct. 2002) 
(China). 
63  Danny Friedmann, Oscillating from Safe Harbor to Liability: China’s IP Regulation and 
Omniscient Intermediaries, WORLD INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY MAP, MAPPING INTERMEDIARY 
LIABILITY TRENDS ONLINE (May 18, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2969807. 
64 Daniel Seng, Comparative Analysis Of The National Approaches To The Liability Of Internet 
Intermediaries, 20 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION.  
65 Regulation on the Protection of the Right to Communicate Works to the Public Over 
Information Networks, Order No. 468 (promulgated by the the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China, May 18, 2006, effective July 1, 2006), CLI.2.76727(EN) (pkulaw). 
66  Friedmann, supra note 63. 
67 Xiao Ma, Establishing an Indirect Liability System for Digital Copyright Infringement in China: 
Experience from the United States' Approach, 4 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 253, 273–74 (2015). 
68 Supreme People’s Court, Dec. 17, 2012, Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Several 
Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Hearing Civil Dispute Cases Involving Infringement 
of the Right of Dissemination on Information Networks (Ch.) [https://perma.cc/U5ES-J7BV]. 
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obligations are concerned.  
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C. Need for an International Approach to the Issue 
The differences in domestic copyright enforcement regimes and, especially 
the differences in ISPs’ liability among EU (after the Directive) and non-EU 
countries, suggest that an international approach to these issues is desirable to limit 
a negative impact on ISPs. The certainty of the applicable law for the ISPs can 
facilitate the expansion and management of the internet business and help to 
achieve a better protection of copyrights.  
1. Lack of Harmonization Poses Difficulties to ISPs 
As shown above, domestic legislations around the world have different 
approaches for the role of the ISPs and their liability and safe harbor provisions. 
This lack of harmonization will be increased as a consequence of the Directive 
(especially because each member state may be implementing the Copyright 
Directive differently) mainly affecting ISPs with a worldwide presence.  
[L]egal changes in one country create global effects. In 
theory, [ISPs] can apply different policies and use different 
technologies to meet geographically diverse legal obligations. In 
practice, though, service providers have to make complex 
decisions about whether and to what extent they adjust their 
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policies and practices to accommodate differing laws…. [it] is 
economically infeasible to institute different policies outside of 
Europe. Users of those services will feel the effects worldwide. 
Other services may choose to simply cease operations in the EU. 
For those companies capable of differentiating their services 
(assuming it is possible to comply at all), this represents a step 
toward a more fragmented internet — a legal wall put up in 
defiance of the idea of the internet as a borderless space for 
exchanging information.69 
In sum, varying national legal systems create substantial uncertainty for 
Google and all the other “internet giants” as they face different liabilities and safe 
harbors depending on the applicable law. Thus, they are forced to adopt various 
technical methods and legal strategies to approach these differences to avoid 
liability. This may create a slowdown in the internet as well as a negative impact 
on the global economy. 
2. Impact of the EU Directive on Copyright on International  
  ISPs 
It might be argued that as a result of the Directive, there will be a big shift 
as far as ISPs’ liability is concerned with negative results at international level. 
Indeed, the Directive expressly provides that the ISPs will be performing an act of 
communication to the public, or shall notify the public when it gives the public 
access to copyright protected works uploaded by its users. These acts will be 
deemed unauthorized if the ISPs do not get authorization from the right holders. In 
these cases, the ISPs will be primarily liable rather than secondary liable.  
Therefore, it may be argued that in Europe ISPs might be more easily and 
more seriously held liable under the Directive, unless they can show compliance 
with the requisites under section 17.4. Moreover, to avoid liability under the 
Directive, more ex-ante and ex-post obligations are imposed to them as they will 
have to use “best efforts” to handle and comply with a variety of important issues 
such as: 1) obtain an authorization from the right holders; 2) ensure the 
unavailability of specific works; and, 3) prevent future uploads.  
                                               
69  Stan Adams, Doing the Wrong Thing for the Wrong Reasons: Article 13 Replaces Safe 
Harbors with Upload Filters, Won’t Help Artists but Will Hurt the Internet, CDT.ᴏʀɢ (Jan. 18, 
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On the other hand, as the above chart describes, many countries of the world 
impose secondary liability on ISPs based on the doctrine of authorization or the 
actual knowledge of the infringement committed by the user of the platform. 
Therefore, in these cases, it appears less easy to hold ISPs liable. Furthermore, when 
ISPs discover or are informed about the infringement, in non-EU countries they are 
traditionally required to remove the infringing content only and are not required to 
prevent future uploads of infringing materials. 
Thus, it appears clear that in the EU, ISPs will have a more active role 
regarding copyright infringement and an increased liability in case of breach of the 
obligations under the Directive than in other countries. As highlighted above, it 
may be expected that they will have to put in place different legal and technical 
strategies to approach the differences in legislation. Apart from being burdensome, 
the implementation of these strategies (taking into account also the other 
unfavorable provisions of the Directive) will involve relevant financial and human 
resources which may discourage them from promoting innovation. 
III. PROPOSING A SOLUTION: SIGNATURE OF A MULTILATERAL 
INTERNATIONAL TREATY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF WIPO 
Part II proposes that the States of the international community sign a 
Multilateral Treaty in the framework of the WIPO on issues regarding the ISPs. An 
international instrument of this kind would help to achieve harmonization between 
the existing legislations of the States with the aim of providing all actors involved 
in the use of the internet (users, industries, artists and ISPs) with the same 
applicable rules. A standard set of rules will increase the predictability of the 
applicable law for ISPs, leading to an expansion of the internet and to a better 
protection of copyrights.  
A. General Guidelines and Text of the Proposed Treaty  
The suggested Treaty should be negotiated taking into account the common 
rules of the Contracting States applied to ISPs, identifying first what these common 
rules are on the basis of their domestic legislations and case law. Its content should 
include the role of the ISPs, their liability in case of infringing content uploaded by 
their users and applicable safe harbors in case of unlawful activity performed by 
their users.  
1. Text of the Proposed WIPO Treaty  
The proposed Treaty is generally inspired by existing domestic laws such 
as the DMCA and the E-commerce Directive. Moreover, it is drafted following the 
writing style of certain recently adopted International Treaties, such as Chapter 20 
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of the USMCA70 on Intellectual Property Rights. The text of the suggested Treaty 
could be the following:  
Measures applied by ISPs to prevent copyright infringement  
Contracting Parties shall ensure that ISPs, in accordance with high 
industry standards of professional diligence, do their best efforts to 
avoid copyright infringement by the users of their platforms by 
applying minimum, appropriate, proportional and reasonable 
measures. These measures shall include but are not limited to the 
obligation of ISPs to provide sufficient visible notice to users 
warning about the criminal and civil liability involved in uploading 
infringing contents and having their consent as a prior condition for 
the publication of the material71, the implementation of a repeat 
infringer policy as well as a takedown procedure to ensure that the 
infringing content is removed expeditiously. Contracting Parties 
shall ensure that filtering measures potentially applied by ISPs 
voluntarily or compulsorily are specific, limited, do not impose 
substantial costs on ISP or substantial burdens on their systems and 
networks and that they are subject to human review. Contracting 
Parties shall not impose on ISPs a general obligation to actively 
seek facts or circumstances indicating infringing activity.  
Liability of the ISPs 
Contracting Parties shall provide that ISPs are not held primarily 
liable for the infringing content uploaded by the users in their 
platforms unless they have actual knowledge of the unlawful activity 
and take no prompt and effective measures to stop the infringement. 
Safe Harbors  
Contracting Parties shall ensure, in their domestic legislations, that 
ISPs shall have limited liability for the following activities: 
                                               
70 The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, U.S.-Mex.-Can., art. 20, agreed to Oct.1, 2018, 
[hereinafter USMCA] https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/20-
Intellectual-Property-Rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/BA7X-EGBY]. This Agreement provides an 
example of open provisions to be tailor-made by the contracting States regarding intellectual 
property rights.   
71 The notice could be provided by visible pop-ups and/or a header banner. 
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1) Mere conduit 
Mere conduit activities shall include the transmission, routing, 
provision of access to a communication network and the transient 
storage of the information transmitted, by using automatic technical 
processes and for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission. 
Contracting Parties, in their domestic legislations, shall provide for 
specific requirements for the application of this provision, including 
but not limited to the following: the ISP: (a) does not initiate the 
transmission; (b) does not select the receiver of the transmission 
except as an automatic response to the request of another person; 
(c) does not select or modify the information contained in the 
transmission; (d) does not store the information for any period 
longer than is reasonably necessary for the transmission, routing or 
provision of access. 
2) Caching 
Caching activities shall include the automatic, intermediate and 
temporary storage of the information transmitted through the ISP. 
Contracting Parties, in their domestic legislations, shall provide for 
specific requirements for the application of this provision, including 
but not limited to the following: the ISP (a) does not modify the 
information; (b) complies with conditions on access; (c) complies 
with rules regarding the updating of store (including refreshing, 
reloading or other updating of the information) in a manner widely 
used by industry; (d) the provider does not interfere with the lawful 
use of technology, widely recognized and used by industry; (e) acts 
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information it has 
stored upon obtaining actual knowledge of the fact that the 
information has been removed from the network, or access to it has 
been disabled, or that a court or an administrative authority has 
ordered such removal or disablement. 
3) Hosting 
Hosting activities shall include the storage of the information 
transmitted by a user through an ISP. Contracting Parties, in their 
domestic legislations, shall provide for specific requirements for the 
application of this provision, including but not limited to the 
following: the ISP: a) does not have actual knowledge of the 
infringing activity, b) acts expeditiously to remove or to disable 
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access to the information stored upon obtaining actual knowledge 
of the copyright infringement or becoming aware of facts or 
circumstances from which the infringement is apparent, such as 
through receiving a notice of alleged infringement from the 
copyright holder. 
4) Hyperlinking  
Hyperlinking activities shall include the referring or linking users 
to an online location by using information location tools, including 
hyperlinks and directories. Contracting Parties, in their domestic 
legislations, shall provide for specific requirements for the 
application of this provision, including but not limited to the 
conditions established in the subsection 3 above. 
Contracting States shall be free to adopt other safe harbors in 
addition to the above.  
Take down procedure  
Contracting Parties shall ensure that an effective takedown 
procedure is implemented in their domestic legislations on the basis 
of which the ISPs shall expeditiously remove the infringing content 
uploaded by their users upon notice. The take down procedure shall 
include an effective notice of claimed infringement and an effective 
counter-notice by those whose material is removed or disabled 
through mistake or misidentification. The notice of claimed 
infringement must contain sufficient information a) to allow the ISP 
to identify the work allegedly being infringed and the online location 
of the alleged infringement and b) to clearly identify the person 
sending the notice. 
Enforcement  
Contracting Parties shall provide, in their domestic legislations, for 
effective enforcement measures of the provisions contained herein, 
both civil and criminal. In case matters provided under this Treaty 
involve different jurisdictions, Contracting Parties shall cooperate 
among them in order to ensure that any judicial or administrative 
decision issued in one of the Contracting Parties’ country is 
effectively recognized and enforced in another Contracting Parties’ 
country. 
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2. Explanation of the Treaty Key Provisions  
The text of the proposed Treaty was drafted to be attractive for the States to 
sign in terms of flexibility. Keeping in mind how hard it is to obtain a consensus of 
the States of the international community, both to start negotiating an International 
Treaty and then to draft and agree on a common text, the proposed Treaty should 
be as open and flexible as possible. This is so States have more incentives and can 
more easily gain the domestic consensus72 required to sign it. Moreover, to facilitate 
the adoption of this Treaty by the States, its text should include minimum standards 
or general principles to be further adopted by all the signatory’s States in their 
domestic legislations.73 In other words, the States should be free to implement more 
detailed rules based on the general principles provided under the Treaty.  
These minimum standards should also be adopted considering the rules 
which are commonly applied by the States to the Treaty. These common rules seem 
to be the exclusion of a general obligation to monitor by ISPs, the secondary 
liability of ISPs in case of infringing content uploaded by their users and the 
provision of safe harbors.  Moreover, the Treaty should also balance the interests 
of both the copyright owners and entertainment industries on one side and the ISPs 
on the other side74 as well as the users. This to try to achieve a substantial justice 
and gain the consensus of the States as well as of the public opinion.   
a. Role of ISPs 
After agreeing on a common definition of ISPs, considering their domestic 
laws,75 States should discuss and negotiate whether to assign ISPs an active, 
passive, or neutral role. As mentioned earlier, there is a growing tendency, complete 
with lobbyists advocating, to make the ISPs participate in the copyright 
enforcement as they may have more effective technical tools to detect and remove 
the infringing content. In case the States agree to assign a certain degree of 
responsibility of the copyright enforcement to ISPs, the Treaty should also address 
the measures ISPs should implement for this purpose (which are suggested to be 
                                               
72 Both of the public opinion and of the domestic legislative bodies. 
73 USMCA, supra note 70 (providing open rules to be incorporated to the domestic laws of the 
Contracting States).  
74 This is a critical issue because the U.S approach tends to be more protective ofISPs, whereas the 
European approach is more protective of copyright owners. See Leon Trapman, American and 
European Safe Harbors, KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG (Dec. 14, 2016), 
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2016/12/14/american-european-safe-harbours/ (“Where the 
United States seems to find for the ISPs, the European Union places emphasis on protection of the 
right holders”). 
75 The definition was not included in the text of the proposed Treaty.  
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“minimum, appropriate, proportional and reasonable”), including, but not limited 
to, providing “sufficient visible notice” before uploading the content, the 
implementation of a “repeat infringer policy” and a “takedown procedure”. States 
should be free to provide for filtering obligations, without imposing a general 
obligation on ISPs to filter the content uploaded in their platforms. If filtering 
obligations were to be implemented, the proposed text of the Treaty provides that 
these must be “specific, limited” and “not impose substantial costs on ISP or 
substantial burdens on their systems and networks and that they are subject to 
human review”.  
b. Liability of ISPs 
Many countries of the world seem to share the view that, in principle, ISPs 
are not held primarily and directly liable for the infringing content uploaded by 
their users provided that the ISPs do not have actual knowledge of the infringing 
activities and promptly remove the infringing content. Indeed, the user who 
published the material violating the protected material is primarily liable for the 
infringement. However, ISPs are more frequently sued by copyright holders as it is 
easier for them to do so rather than pursuing individuals who are difficult to serve. 
These suits often seek injunctions as well as damages. Therefore, the proposed 
Treaty includes these principles.  
c. Safe Harbors  
Many countries of the world76 grant safe harbors for ISPs for activities 
where ISPs perform only automatic processes and thus do not have active 
participation in the creation, publication, or modification of the content of the 
information transmitted, hosted or stored,77 or actual knowledge of the 
infringement. In general, mere conduit, caching, and hosting activities are 
exempted from liability, provided that some requirements are met. Thus, the 
proposed Treaty could include at least these “traditional” safe harbors and/or 
provide new safe harbors according to the evolution of technology up to date. 
However, the text of the proposed Treaty has included only the “traditional” safe 
harbors in order to more easily get the consensus of the States.  
d. Takedown Procedure 
Many countries of the world have adopted a takedown procedure or a notice 
                                               
76 Including: The United States, Europe, Canada, Australia and China. USMCA, supra note 70, at 
art. 20.88. 
77 See L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011. 
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and takedown regime; the suggested Treaty proposes to implement a basic common 
takedown procedure, by which the ISPs remove the infringing content posted in 
their platforms after notice by the copyright owner. It should also include an 
effective notice and counter-notice, to be further implemented in detail in their 
domestic legislation. The Treaty should also include the obligation of the ISP to 
expeditiously restore the material which was removed or disabled through mistake 
or misidentification or when there is enough reliable evidence that the allegedly 
infringing material does not infringe any copyright, including but not limited to a 
judgment by any judicial or administrative authority.  
e. Enforcement Measures  
The content of the Treaty must be able to be enforced at the domestic level 
in order to be effective. This is why it includes a section by which the Contracting 
Parties undertake to provide in their domestic legislation for effective enforcement 
of its provisions both at the civil and criminal levels. Contracting States should be 
free to adopt the remedies they consider appropriate. Civil remedies should include 
at least injunction proceedings against ISPs in case they authorize or participate in 
infringing activities, fines in case they do not provide for measures to prevent the 
infringement (including closing down the website if they do not comply with the 
national law applying the Treaty), and monetary damages for the benefit of 
copyright owners and users. Criminal remedies should be provided for serious 
conducts (to be determined by each Contracting State) and should include 
imprisonment and/or administrative penalties.  
B. Reasons for Adopting the Proposal  
The Treaty outlined above would provide great benefits in terms of 
harmonization, economic utility, and improvement of the copyright system 
enforcement. The proposal may seem ambitious because it aims at getting the 
consensus of the States about important and controversial issues. However, the 
benefits are worth the effort of the States in finding common grounds on which the 
Treaty may be based. 
1. Harmonization  
The proposed Treaty would provide common rules that would help to 
harmonize the existing legislation among the Contracting States in the subject 
matter of the Treaty. States will later be able to tailor these rules in their domestic 
legislations according to their specific needs and culture. Therefore, a Treaty of this 
kind would respect each individual State’s culture and needs providing at the same 
time uniform rules for industries, copyright owners, and ISPs.  
EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market and ISP Liability: What's 
Next at International Level? 
 
 107 
The Treaty, by providing the same minimum set of rules to the actors 
involved in the world of the internet, would increase the predictability of the 
applicable law. Predictable rules would provide benefits not only for the ISPs but 
also for the copyright owners who will know, for instance, that in the Member 
States of the Treaty they will be able to rely on a takedown procedure having the 
same common principles. In the end, even if the suggested Treaty is mainly 
addressed on ISPs, all actors involved in the world of the internet, such as 
industries, copyright owners, and ISPs will benefit from it.  
2. Economic Utility 
The suggested Treaty would entail positive effects for the economy both at 
the domestic and international levels for several reasons. First, a positive 
consequence of having an International Treaty with uniform rules concerning the 
ISPs is that they will have a strong incentive to expand their business beyond 
borders. This will lead to an international expansion of internet services. This 
expansion will benefit the global economy by promoting the creation and use of 
new technologies as well as by encouraging the creation of new jobs in the States 
adopting the Treaty. Moreover, the potential international expansion of the ISPs 
will increase the competition among them, forcing ISPs to provide better and 
cheaper services. Indirectly, by providing common rules to the ISPs, the consumers 
will also benefit.  
3. Improvement of the Copyright System Enforcement  
It seems undeniable that a common set of rules concerning ISPs will 
improve the protection of copyrights at the international level. First, it will be more 
difficult for copyright infringers to violate the rights of copyright owners because 
ISPs will apply the same basic anti-copyright infringement measures in all of the 
Contracting States. Copyright infringers will be prevented from publishing 
infringing content in most Countries78 by using the same minimum measures. 
Therefore, the Treaty is expected to render it more difficult for copyright infringers 
to move from one platform to another (platforms which may be located in different 
places) trying to find a more favorable ISP (that is to say an ISP favorable or 
indifferent to the publication of infringing content). This is because all ISPs will be 
forced to apply the same rules and will face the same liability. In the end, it may be 
expected that the phenomenon of copyright infringement is likely to be reduced in 
extent and therefore, copyright owners and industries will benefit both from an 
economic and non-economic standpoint.  
                                               
78 It would be quite unrealistic to imagine that all countries of the world will sign the Treaty.  
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IV. RESPONDING TO POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF THE PROPOSAL  
The main criticisms that the proposal may face are that: A) it is not 
politically feasible because most countries of the world will not be willing to 
negotiate an International Treaty on the liability of the ISPs for a variety of reasons; 
and, B) the proposed Treaty does not balance the interests of the actors involved in 
the world of the internet (mainly IPSs, copyright owners and internet users). Each 
of the above criticisms will be discussed hereinbelow. 
A. The Proposed International Treaty is not Political Feasible  
Many scholars, legal professionals, and people in the public opinion may 
hold that the International Treaty proposed in this Paper is “unrealistic” and 
“utopian”. They may argue that it is tough to “convince” the States to sit around a 
table and negotiate a treaty of this kind. The reasons for this expected reluctance 
may differ among the countries. Some States may think that the topic is not urgent 
or important and therefore they may decide to commit their own (possibly limited) 
resources to other issues. Some other States may find it difficult to agree on the 
proposed subject matter of the treaty and thus may simply consider that it is not 
worthwhile to participate in the negotiations. Finally, some other States (especially 
in the cases of underdeveloped countries) may not even believe that the liability of 
the ISPs is a “hot topic” applicable to them and, therefore, is not worth regulating 
from a worldwide perspective. 
I acknowledge that the proposed International Treaty may be considered 
“unrealistic” and “utopian”. As discussed earlier in this paper, the idea of promoting 
the signature of an International Treaty, regardless of the topic involved, is not an 
easy task. States have different, and in most cases opposing, interests. However, in 
order to make the proposed treaty appealing to the States, it is of essence that the 
WIPO (as the international body which this Paper suggests it should hold the 
meetings for the discussion of the Treaty) prepares a detailed working proposal 
including all the basic information that a State may need to decide to participate in 
the negotiation. This working proposal should explain in detail why the Treaty is 
needed and include the starting points for the discussion as well as the benefits that 
the Treaty is expected to produce.  
Once the representatives of the States fully understand the benefits and 
advantages of the suggested Treaty thanks to the working proposal prepared by 
WIPO, I believe that they will weigh its pros and cons and decide to join the 
invitation to negotiate the Treaty. The following steps (negotiations, agreement on 
the text, and signature of the Treaty) will not be easy, but these complicated 
procedures are an intrinsic part of the “game” played by sovereign nations in the 
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B. The Suggested Treaty Does Not Balance the Interests of the Actors 
  Involved in the World of Internet 
Another potential criticism against the suggested Treaty is that it does not 
effectively balance the interests of the main actors involved in the world of the 
internet, including copyright owners, internet users, ISPs, publishing companies, 
music industries, etc. It may be argued that the Treaty provides too many benefits 
for the ISPs at the expense of the other actors mentioned. The content of the Treaty 
proposed above tries to weigh the interests of every “player” in the field so that it 
may appear to be as balanced and fair as possible for a variety of reasons. First, 
even if it may seem a “utopian” goal, the suggested Treaty aims at achieving 
fairness and reasonableness on the grounds that the need to regulate the activities 
of the ISPs may not necessarily go against the interests of the copyright owners and 
the internet users. Second, the suggested Treaty needs to be perceived as “fair” by 
the public in order to gain consensus and public acceptance. Otherwise, the 
potential criticisms raised by the public may undermine the Treaty’s expected 
benefits. Moreover, States should feel more compelled to negotiate and sign the 
Treaty if it is perceived as “balanced” by the public opinion of those States. 
Obviously, for political reasons, no State in the world would be willing to sign a 
Treaty that is perceived as unfair or unreasonable by their public. In sum, the Treaty 
should effectively be a win-win opportunity for all players (and should be perceived 
as such), rather than favor some players over others. 
As mentioned earlier, the suggested Treaty aims at regulating the activity of 
the ISPs in a balanced way by protecting all the actors involved. The Treaty protects 
the interests of the ISPs by providing e.g. that ISPs are required to apply minimum, 
appropriate, proportional and reasonable measures to prevent copyright 
infringement, that potential filtering obligations should not impose substantial costs 
on ISP or substantial burdens on their systems and networks, and that ISPs will not 
have a general obligation to actively seek facts or circumstances indicating 
infringing activity. The interests of the copyright owners are also protected by 
providing that the ISPs will be required to implement a repeat infringer policy as 
well as a takedown procedure to ensure that the infringing content is removed 
expeditiously. Moreover, the interests of the internet users are protected by 
providing a counter-notice procedure in case the material uploaded is removed or 
disabled by the ISPs through mistake or misidentification.  
Lastly, it is worth pointing out that the suggested content of the Treaty 
should be considered a starting point for the discussion among the States. It is 
desirable that before and during the negotiations of the Treaty, the WIPO organizes 
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working meetings among the copyright owners, internet users, ISPs, publishing 
companies, and music industries both at the national and international levels to 
discuss and find common grounds and shared solutions which may enrich and 
enhance the Treaty.  
V. CONCLUSION 
It may be argued that the EU Copyright Directive has introduced a European 
regime of ISPs’ secondary liability which may appear in contrast with the existing 
laws in countries outside the EU. This lack of harmonization will have a negative 
impact on the ISPs and will eventually lead to a slowdown of the internet on a 
global scale. In order to overcome the effects of the non-harmonized legislations 
on the ISPs, the signature of an International Treaty in the framework of WIPO is 
encouraged. This Treaty should include issues such as the role of the ISPs, the 
liability of the ISPs, and safe harbors for ISPs. The benefits expected from the 
Treaty are far more significant than the potential criticisms raised against it.  
